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Gary S. FIELDS 
Departments of Economics and Labor Economics 
Cornell University 
I thaca, New York, U.S.A. 
and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The system of publicly-provided old age pensions, known in the United 
States as "Social Security," faces serious f inancial d i f f icu l t ies . As in other 
countries, the problems are of both a short run and a long run nature. The short 
run problem is that the U.S. Social Security system has very meager f inancial 
reserves; the revenues coming into the system are barely enough to cover 
commitments. In the long run (i.e., af ter 2010, when the post World War I I baby 
boom generation reaches ret i rement age), the f inancial problems of Social 
Security w i l l intensi fy, due pr imar i ly to population aging and the consequent 
decline in the rat io of workers to ret irees. For an elaboration of these 
problems, see Thompson, 1983. 
These problems have led to proposed reforms aimed at assuring the 
f inancial stabi l i ty of the systems. The question addressed here is: what ef fects 
w i l l these reforms have on three variables - ret i rement ages, ret i rement 
incomes, and the Social Security system. This paper presents estimates of the 
ef fects of four actual or proposed policy changes. The basic model and some of 
the est imated ef fects are drawn f rom previous work; see Fields and Mi tchel l 
(1984) and the references c i ted therein. However, the estimates presented here 
of the ef fects of Social Security reforms on the Social Security system i tsel f 
are new. 
I I . THE LIFE CYCLE FRAMEWORK 
The basic analyt ical f ramework is the economist's model of l i fe cycle 
decision-making. This model maintains that inter temporal choices are made 
* Research support was provided by the National Commission for Employment 
Policy. All opinions are the authors'. 
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wi th reference to inter temporal preferences and an inter temporal budget set. 
Perhaps the most fami l iar application is to educational decision-making, 
wherein the individual is thought to decide how much schooling to acquire on 
the basis of his or her preferences and the income and job opportunities 
associated w i th al ternate educational at tainments. As regards ret i rement, 
although the f i rs t round empir ical models were l imi ted to a single period only 
(e.g., Quinn, 1977; Boskin and Hurd, 1978; Clark and Johnson, 1980), the 
ret i rement decision is today regarded in l i fe cycle terms.1 That is, the 
individual is viewed as deciding how long to work and when to re t i re on the 
basis of the income f rom various sources that would be realized at alternate 
ret i rement ages and the associated amounts of leisure.2 
Figure 1 depicts graphically the l i fe cycle ret i rement model. The horizontal 
axis measures RET, the length of the expected ret i rement period f rom any 
given ret i rement age R unt i l the- end of the individual's expected l i f e t ime . The 
ver t ica l axis measures PDVY, the present discounted value of expected l i fe t ime 
income over the remainder of one's l i fe t ime for an individual who ret ires at 
age R . PDVY is the sum of earnings unt i l ret i rement plus employer-provided 
pension and Social Security benefits thereaf ter , a l l appropriately discounted for 
t ime preference and for mor ta l i t y . The inter temporal budget set, shown as AA' 
in Figure 1, represents the possible combinations of income and ret i rement 
years. As shown in the f igure, PDVY increases as RET decreases, ref lect ing the 
fact that for the average worker, an addit ional year of work generates earnings 
and pension accruals which exceed the ret i rement income foregone. 
Indifferences curves are drawn as in BB' , ref lect ing the usual assumptions about 
income and leisure being goods and the u t i l i t y funct ion being increasing and 
concave in both goods. Given budget set AA ' and indif ference curves l ike BB', 
the opt imal re t i rement age is R* - that which maximizes intertemporal 
u t i l i t y subject to the inter temporal budget set. 
To est imate how Social Security and other income sources a f fec t workers' 
choices of ret i rement ages, informat ion is required on the actual ret i rement 
age chosen and the inter temporal budget set facing each worker. We 
constructed the necessary data for a sample of 1,024 white males covered by 
the Longitudinal Ret i rement History Survey for the years 1969 through 1977. To 
these data, we f i t an Ordered Logi t model of a type suggested by McFadden 
(1974, 1978) and Small (1981, 1982). The probabi l i ty of selecting ret i rement age 
j f rom among several ordered alternatives is described as: 
1 Says Quinn (forthcoming), who formulated one of the earlier models: "Until 
relatively recently, analysis tended to describe the magnitude of retirement 
income rights by the size of the annual benefit, or by its close relative, the 
replacement rate . Though useful summary statistics, these annual flow 
concepts ignore key aspects of the retirement incentives: in particular, how 
annual benefits change with continued work or with inflation after 
retirement." 
Some might question whether retirement is a choice at all or whether it is 
compelled by poor health or mandatory retirement. The U.S. evidence shows 
that the great majority of workers could go on working (i.e., their health is 
sound and they have not yet reached the age of mandatory retirement in 
their firms) but elect to retire earlier, presumably to enjoy more leisure. 
See Fields and Mitchell, (1984), for a summary of this l i terature. 
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Pj = 
where 
exp(a In PDVY. + b In RET. + N.) r
 J J J 
I exp(a In PDVY k + b In RET k + Nk ) 
(1) 
N k = 1/2 [In (1/2) + In (1 + PJ^/Pj + In (1 + P j ^ / P j ] 
and P° is the probability of selecting retirement age k in a conventional 
multinomial logit model. 
Social Security reforms alter the streams of available Social Security 
benefits and hence the PDVY streams as well. The post-reform budget sets are 
then substituted into the Ordered Logit model. Predictions from the new and 
old budget sets may then be compared. The difference between the two is the 
change in retirement age predicted from the Social Security reform in question. 
Changes in retirement incomes are found by comparing incomes under the new 
rules with incomes under the old, taking account of changes in retirement ages 
which result from the rule changes. The effects of Social Security reforms on 
the Social Security system are found by looking at changes in Social Security 
benefits paid out and Social Security payroll taxes received. 
I I I . EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF FOUR SOCIAL 
SECURITY REFORMS PRELIMINARIES 
The first step is to estimate the intertemporal budget set under the 
existing rules. The first three rows of Table 1 present the annual amounts for 
Components of the 1982 pr 
Annual amounts: 60 
1 . Net earnings $ 16424 
2. Net private
 g 3 7 
pension benefits 
3. Social security 
benefit: Husband 5378 
Wife 2449 
Present discounted values: 
4. PDVE 0 
5. PDVPP 4272 
6. PDVSS: Husband 67402 
Wife 25126 
Total lifetime income: 
[PDVY=(4) + (5) + ( 6 ) ] 96800 
61 
16265 
962 
5401 
2579 
15793 
4697 
67697 
25245 
113433 
a
 Computations use 1982 Social Security ru 
TABLE 1 
-reform budget set for the LRHS illustrat 
(in 1982 dollars) 
62 
16330 
1356 
5456 
2636 
30803 
6115 
68387 
25482 
130988 
les; see tex 
Totals may differ from column sums due to rounding 
Source: 
Fields and Mitchell (1984), Table 10.1. 
If retirement is at 
63 
16012 
1875 
5964 
2720 
45238 
8318 
69242 
25696 
148495 
64 
15882 
1817 
6481 
2823 
58770 
7657 
69515 
25836 
161790 
age: 
65 
15952 
1896 
7017 
2948 
71580 
7573 
69341 
25819 
174315 
ive worker 
66 
15877 
2128 
7307 
3069 
83836 
8036 
66311 
25429 
183613 
67 
15845 
2129 
7605 
3190 
95432 
7575 
63173 
24782 
190963 
68 
15752 
2069 
7610 
3301 
106406 
6914 
59928 
23842-
197092 
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each component, the next three rows the corresponding present discounted 
values of the components, and the last row the present discounted value of 
to ta l income. Space does not permit fur ther elaboration; details are available 
f rom the authors upon request. 
The next step is to determine the parameters of the Ordered Logi t model 
indicating how these income opportunit ies and the corresponding amount of 
leisure a f fec t ret i rement behavior. Both income and leisure are found to exhibit 
stat ist ical ly signif icant e f fects . The rat io a/b in equation (1) is est imated to be 
0.60. Furthermore, using a test suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1981), the 
Ordered Logi t f ramework is found to f i t the data better than does the more 
rest r ic t ive Mul t inomial Logi t model. 
The th i rd step is to detai l the various Social Security reforms under 
consideration and to compare them wi th the pre-reform rules.3 To be eligible 
for any Social Security benef i t at a l l , the worker must have earned at least a 
cer ta in min imum sum in the past. I f he meets this requirement, he can col lect 
Social Security benefits as early as age 62, though age 65 is the "normal" 
ret i rement age. The amount of his benefi t is determined in three steps: (1) 
Finding his Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) between 1951 and the 
year in which he turns 60; (2) Determining his Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) 
as a funct ion of his AIME; and (3) Computing his Social Security benefi t as a 
mul t ip le of his PIA. A t present, the mult ip le is 1.00 i f the worker is age 65 
when he begins to col lect benefi ts. An early ret i rement reduction factor of 6 
2/3 % per year is applied for each year before age 65 i f benefits are taken 
early, and a delayed ret i rement credi t of 3 % per year is awarded to workers 
wai t ing unt i l a f ter age 65 to re t i re . Final ly, spouse's benefi ts, I f any, must be 
added. The w i fe is el igible to receive benefits based on her husband's PIA. I f 
she is 65, she receives a benef i t equal to 50 % of his PIA. I f she is 62 or over 
but not yet 65, she may receive a reduced benef i t ; the reduction is at the rate 
Present discounted 
value of expected 
lifetime income 
(PDVY) 
PDVY (R*) 
B' 
A' \ 
Intertemporal 
Budget 
Set 
Intertemporal 
Indifference Curve 
1 ^ T " B 
1 \ _ 
1 \ 
1 \ 
! N A 
1 
1 
1 
i 
RET(R*) 
Source: Fields and Mitchell (1984), 
Figure 2.3. 
Length of 
Retirement 
Period 
(RET) 
Figure 1 
A graphical representation of the life cycle retirement model 
For this purpose, the 1982 rules are used. 
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of 8 1/3 % per year . There is no delayed r e t i r e m e n t cred i t for spouse s 
benef i ts . Benef i ts for both the worker and the spouse are increased each year 
in accordance w i t h in f l a t ion . 
As shown in F igure 2 , the Social Securi ty re forms examined here operate by 
a f f e c t i n g the mul t ip les . The p r e - r e f o r m rules a r e depicted in the top panel and 
Multiple 
1.00 
.80 — -
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
• 
1 
t 
1 
1 
1 
1.09 
Pre-reform structure 
I Age of 
68 retirement 
.80 
.80x(1-.023) 
Experiment A: Increasing the 
normal retirement age 
.023) 
Experiment B: Delaying 
cost-of-living adjustments 
Experiment C: Raising the 
late retirement credit 
Experiment D: Changing the early 
retirement reduction factor 
Age of 
retirement 
Source: Fields and Mitchell (1984), Figure 10.1. 
Figure 2 
Restructuring social security benefits: four experiments 
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are redrawn as l ighter lines in each of the remaining panels. The reforms 
appear as heavier lines in panels A - D . 
Four reforms, similar to ones actual ly legislated in 1983 or proposed for 
legislat ion, can now be described: 
Experiment A. Increasing the normal retirement age means that a worker 
who ret i res at age 65 no longer receives a benef i t equal to his PIA. Experiment 
A- simulates the e f fec t of raising this age to age 68, as was widely proposed. 
(What in fact was legislated was a change to age 66 by the year 2009 and to 
age 67 by the year 2027). Under the simualted re fo rm, the mul t ip le becomes 
1.00 at age 68 and the early ret i rement reduction factor remains at 6 2/3 % 
per year. Thus, the mult iples under this experiment are .60 for ret i rement age 
62 and .80 for ret i rement age age 65, w i th corresponding reductions at other 
ages. (The 1983 legislation set a minimum mult ip le of 70 %). 
Experiment B. Delaying the cost-of-living adjustment 
Rule in e f fec t in 1982 specified that cost-of- l iv ing adjustment would take 
place each July, re f lec t ing increases in the Consumer Price Index during the 
preceding calendar year. The 1983 legislation amendments delayed these 
increases by an addit ional six months. This six months delay reduces real 
benefits by half the rate of in f la t ion, or 2.3 %. 
Experiment C. Raising the late retirement credit means that benefits are 
increased faster than 3 % i f ret i rement is postponed beyond age 65. We 
simulated a 6 2/3 % per year late ret i rement credi t , the same as the early 
ret i rement reduction factor . The mul t ip le for ret i rement at age 68 would have 
risen f rom 1.09 to 1.20. (As i t turned out, in 1983), Congress mandated a 
gradual increase in the late ret i rement credi t , eventually reaching 8 % per year 
as of the year 2009). 
Effects on the Intertemporal Budget Set 
The ef fects of these reforms on the annual and l i fe t ime streams of Social 
Security benefits appear in Table 2; ef fects on to ta l income f rom earnings, 
employer-provided pensions, and Social Security combined appear in Table 3. 
These calculations are for an i l lust rat ive worker whose earnings history 
corresponds to that of the average male in our LRHS Sample. Compared to the 
exist ing system a l l reforms imply benefi t cuts but the amounts and shapes of 
the cuts d i f fer f r om one re form to another. 
Increasing the normal ret i rement age to 68 (Experiment A) lowers 
ret i rement benefits by more than $1,000 per year, or about $17,000 for people 
re t i r ing in their early 60's; the reduction is almost as large for workers 
deferr ing ret i rement unt i l age 65. Another e f fec t of Experiment A is to t i l t the 
Social Security benef i t structure toward actuar ia l neutra l i ty , in stark contrast 
to the pre-reform si tuat ion which contained a penalty for continuing to work. 
Thus, increasing the normal ret i rement age as out l ined here lowers benefits at 
any given ret i rement age and provides new f inancial incentives to remain on 
the job longer. 
Experiment B, in which the cost-of- l iv ing adjustment is postponed six 
months, has a re lat ively small e f fec t . Annual benefits are reduced by $100-200, 
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TABLE 2 
Effects of the four experiments on annual and present discounted values 
of social security benefits for the illustrative worker a 
(in 1982 dollars) 
Retirement age 
Annual SS benefits: 
Status quo 
Experiment A 
Experiment B 
Experiment C 
Experiment D 
60 b 
5378 
4034 
5255 
5378 
3698 
61 b 
5401 
4052 
5278 
5401 
3714 
62 
5456 
4093 
5331 
5456 
3752 
63 
5964 
4588 
5827 
5964 
4818 
64 
6481 
5092 
6332 
6481 
5903 
65 
7017 
5614 
6856 
7017 
7017 
66 
7307 
6148 
7139 
7567 
7307 
67 
7605 
6696 
7430 
8131 
7605 
68 
7910 
7256 
7728 
8707 
7910 
Status quo 
Experiment A 
Experiment B 
Experiment C 
Experiment D 
67402 
50566 
65852 
67402 
46352 
67697 
50783 
66140 
67697 
46551 
68387 
51300 
66814 
68387 
47025 
69242 
53275 
67649 
69242 
55936 
69515 
54624 
67916 
69515 
63316 
69341 
55474 
67746 
69342 
69342 
66311 
55798 
64786 
68674 
66311 
63173 
55621 
61720 
67540 
63173 
59928 
54974 
58550 
65969 
59928 
a
 The figures reported in this table are husbands' benefits. Wives' benefits remain constant, since they are calculated from their husband's PIA, which 
does not change in these experiments. 
These are the benefits the illustrative individual would receive if he filed for benefits at age 62 but retired at the age indicated. 
Source: 
Fields and Mitchell (1984), Table 10.2. 
o 
00 
TABLE 3 
Effects of the four experiments on the present value of total lifetime income 
Age of retirement: 
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 
Current system: 
Experiment A: 
Increasing the normal 
retirement age 
Experiment B: 
Delaying cost-of-
living adjustments 
Experiment C: 
Raising the late 
retirement credit 
Experiment D: 
Changing the early 
retirement reduction 
factor 
96801 
77964 
95251 
96801 
75750 
113433 
96519 
111870 
113433 
92287 
130988 
113900 
129415 
130988 
109625 
148495 161780 174315 
132528 146888 160447 
146902 160181 172720 
148495 161780 174315 
135189 155580 174315 
183613 190963 197092 
173100 183411 192138 
182088 189510 195714 
185976 195330 203132 
183613 190963 197092 
Source: 
Fields ana Mitchell (1984), Table 10.3. 
,8a»3 8 8-l?^Sy 13*?5"3S«S13i:8 um%* ?m B . £ * 
which translates into diminished present discounted values of at most $1,600. 
Since the income amounts involved are small , this re form does not appreciably 
al ter the pat tern of discounted benefi t gains obtained by deferr ing re t i rement . 
Experiment C raises the late ret i rement credi t to match the early 
ret i rement reduction factor . Benefits are increased af ter age 65, raising annual 
benefits by as much as $800 at age 68. Present value at age 68 increses by $6, 
000 - s t i l l not enough to achieve actuar ial neutra l i ty , but substantially reducing 
the penalty (in PDV terms) for continuing to work beyond age 65. 
Experiment D lowers early Social Security benefi ts, holding benefits beyond 
age 65 the same. For a worker re t i r ing at age 62 or before, the annual benefit 
would have fal len by $1,700 and present discounted value by some $21, 000. The 
gain in present discounted value of Social Security benefits for an extra year of 
work before age 65 would have been $6,000-9,000. This re form would have 
created a powerful penalty for re t i r ing early and a powerful incentive for 
continued work. Yet , as we shall see, even those forces would not change 
ret i rement ages very much. 
Effects on Retirement Ages 
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the changes in ret i rement ages predicted for 
each of the four reforms. The largest e f fec t is that found under Experiment D, 
which cuts benefits at the earl iest ret i rement age whi le of fer ing a larger 
reward for continued work af ter age 62. Workers would ret i re about three 
months later, on average, as a result of this re fo rm. Intermediate ret i rement 
responses are found under Experiment A , which changes the normal ret i rement 
age. Benefits are lowered by approximately the same dollar amount at every 
age but the gain f rom working an addit ional year is unchanged. This is 
predicted to delay ret i rement by about one and half months, on average. The 
smallest responses occur when early ret i rement benefits are altered the least. 
Both Experiment B (delaying cost-of- l iv ing adjustments) and Experiment C 
(raising the late ret i rement credit) are of this type. These reforms are 
predicted to delay ret i rement by an average of less than one week each. 
A l l in a l l , the results suggest that workers w i l l work longer i f Social 
Security benefits are cut , but not too much. This generic conclusion is 
consistent w i th estimates obtained by others using d i f ferent models and 
simulating d i f ferent reforms. Burtless and M o f f i t t (1984) est imate that a ten 
percent change in Social Security benefits would af fects ret i rement ages by 
about one month. Hausman and Wise (1983) calculate that i f instead of the 
actual 50 % increase in PIA that took place between 1969 and 1975, PIAs had 
remained the same, only 3 % fewer people would have ret i red at age 65 and 4 
% fewer at age 66. Gustman and Steinmeier (1983) predict that a two-year 
increase in the normal ret i rement age would increase the average ret i rement 
age by about two months and that a six month cost of l iv ing deferral would 
raise the average ret i rement age by less than one month. 
In sum, the various research findings are str ik ingly similar in suggesting 
substantial Social Security reforms of the type considered here have only small 
ef fects on the average age of retirement."* 
11
 We suspect that the only way to greatly increase ret i rement ages is to 
raise the age for eariy Social Security benefits, but this suspicion cannot be 
tested wi th the available models. 
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o 
TABLE 4 
Effects of the four experiments on retirement ages, present discounted values of social security benefits (PDVSS) and 
total lifetime income (PDVY), and the financial status of the social security system 
Experiment A: 
Increasing the 
normal retirement 
age 
Experiment B: 
Delaying cost-of-
living adjustments 
(1) 
Change in 
retirement 
age in months 
(AR) 
+ 1.6 
+ 0.1 
(2) 
% A PDVSS with 
retirement age 
' endogenous 
- 2 2 % 
-2% 
(3) 
% A PDVY with 
retirement age 
age endogenous 
- 9 % 
- 1 % 
Savings to the Social Security System 
(4) 
Due to 
increased 
contributions 
+$355 
+ 27 
(5) 
Due to 
decreased 
payouts 
+$15,167 
+ 1,593 
(6) 
Total, 
(4) + (5) 
+$15,522 
+ 1,620 
Experiment C: 
Raising the late 
retirement credit + 0.2 + 55 - 6 + 54 
Experiment D: 
Changing the 
early retirement 
reduction factor 
+ 2.9 11 % - 3 % + 655 + 7,412 +8,067 
Sources: 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 - Fields and Mitchell (1984), Table 10.4; Columns 4, 5, and 6 calculated as in text. 
imn-fi mm *'WAUmm* « s i 3 &. m 
Effects on Retirement Incomes 
Whether Social Security reforms af fec t ret i rement incomes, and i f so by 
how much, depends on the extent of the shift in the benef i t schedule (lower 
benefits at each ret i rement age) compared to the extent of movement along 
the new schedule (higher benefits due to deferred ret i rement) . Some may have 
throught that in response to a lower benefi t schedule, workers would postpone 
ret i rement by enough to keep their ret i rement incomes unchanged. However, 
the small changes in ret i rement ages found in Column 1 unchanged. However, 
the small changes in ret i rement ages found in Column 1 suggest otherwise. 
Indeed, as shown in Column 2, the reforms would cut the Social Security 
benefits received, even af ter taking account of the lengthened work l i fe and 
consequent increase in annual Social Security benefi ts. These cuts are as large 
as 22 % under Experiment A, which increases the normal re t i rement age. The 
ef fects are largest under this experiment than under the others, because i t 
reduces early ret i rement benefits a great deal while retaining a small incentive 
for prolonged work. Even though ret i rement is deferred somewhat, increased 
employer-provided pensions and earnings do not make up the di f ference. As 
shown in Column 3, af ter taking account of postponed ret i rement on earnings, 
pension, and Social Security, the e f fec t of the Social Security reforms is s t i l l to 
lower ret i rement incomes - by as much as 9 % in the case of Experiment A . 
Thus, because ret i rement ages are not very elastic w i th respect to changes in 
the Social Security benefi t s t ructure, ret i rement incomes would be expected to 
fal l . 
Effects on the Social Security System 
The Social Security system's f inancial problems are al leviated under the 
various reforms to the extent that either of two things happens: (1) Workers 
work longer, so they and their employers contr ibut ing on their behalf each pay 
more into the Social Security system, and/or (2) Retirees receive less in to ta l 
benefits f rom the system. The increased contr ibut ion e f fec t is found by 
mul t ip ly ing the average deferra l of re t i rement by the average gross earnings in 
each year, and then applying the combined employer/employee contr ibut ion rate 
to the result (6.7 % for each in 1982, the year for which these calculations 
were made). Savings to the system due to increased contributions appear in 
Column A of Table 4. The savings to the Social Security system f rom lower 
benefit payouts is simply the mir ror image of the loss to workers in present 
discounted value of Social Security benefi ts. This is found by comparing the 
benefi t at the average ret i rement age under the pre-reform formula wi th the 
benefit at the new ret i rement age under the experimental formula. Savings to 
the system due to decreased payouts appear in Column 5. Tota l savings are 
shown in Column 6. 
In each case, the Social Security system comes out ahead: by more than 
$15,000 in the case of Experiment A (increasing the normal re t i rement age) and 
by more than $8, 000 for Experiment D (changing the early ret i rement 
reduction factor) . Given that there are mil l ions of Social Security recipients, 
the system would gain many bil l ions of dollars i f these reforms were 
implemented. For example, i f 20 mi l l ion workers (the number now receiving 
Social Security benefits) were each to receive £15,000 less on balance in the 
course of their l i fe t imes, the system would gain some £300 billion. This 
surpasses by more than $100 bi l l ion the Social Security def ic i t that was viewed 
as unacceptable and which prompted the Social Security amendments of 1983. 
Yet , even this huge sum would go only a small part of the way toward meeting 
the mul t i - t r l / I ion dollar long term def ic i t of the system. 
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Of course, the gains for the system are to a large degree losses for 
ret i rees, since extra earnings and employer-provided pensions would go only 
part of the way toward f i l l ing the gap created by less generous Social Security 
benefits. Those who thought that the U.S. Social Security system could be saved 
at the expense of workers' leisure but not their old age incomes appear to have 
been sadly mistaken. 
IV. A CONCLUDING WORD 
D i f f i cu l t societal decisions w i l l have to be made to deal w i th the two 
central demographic changes of the Twenty-Fi rst Century: the arr iva l of the 
postwar baby boom cohort at ret i rement age and the projected continued 
lengthening of the l i f e span. In the absence of change, future generations w i l l 
be asked to maintain annual ret i rement incomes at their present real levels 
while also increasing the number of ret i rement years. Social Security is 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, so the workers of the future w i l l face the 
costs d i rect ly . I t seems unlikely that they w i l l pay them without protest. I t 
remains to be seen which w i l l give - income per year of ret i rement , number of 
re t i rement years, or both - and by how much. But to expect nothing to give is 
to ignore the intergenerational tension which already is surfacing. 
SUMMARY 
The U.S. Social Security system faces f inancial per i l in both the short and 
long runs due in part to population aging. Various reforms have been proposed 
to help assure the system's f inancial solvency. This paper examines the ef fects 
of four such reforms, including increasing the normal ret i rement age, delaying 
cost-of- l iv ing adjustments, raising the late ret i rement credi t , and changing the 
early ret i rement reduction factor . Increasing the normal ret i rement age is 
est imated to have the largest e f fec t on actual ret i rement ages, but even this 
e f fec t is only on the order of three months; other experiments change average 
ret i rement behavior by even less. Because reductions in Social Security benef i t 
formulas lead to small ret i rement deferrals, the reforms would cause 
ret i rement incomes to fa l l by as much as 9 %. The reforms might save the 
Social Security system as much as $15,000 in l i fe t ime benefits paid out to the 
average worker. For the most par t , though, the system's gains are workers' 
losses. Older persons apparently w i l l not give up much leisure in order to 
qual i fy for higher ret i rement incomes. 
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RESUME 
EFFETS DES REFORMES DE LA SECURITE SOCIALE: 
UN MODELE EMPIRIQUE BASE SUR LES PER/ODES DE LA VIE 
APPLIQUE AUX ETATS-UNIS 
Le fonctionnement du systeme de securite sociaie des Etats-Unis est a 
court et a iong terme mis en danger sur la plan financier. Ce per i l vient en 
part ie du vieii i issement de la population. Diverses reformes ont ete propose'es 
en vue d'assurer ia soivabii i te du systeme. Dans cet te communicat ion, i 'auteur 
examine les effets de quatre de ces reformes, a savoir: i 'eievation de i'age 
normal de la retraite, la post-position des ajustements au cout de ia vie, 
i 'augmentation du credit en cas de retraite tardive, et la modification du 
coefficient de reduction lie a ia re t ra i te anticipee. 
C'est I 'eievation de I'age normal de la retraite qui semble avoir le plus 
large effet sur les ages reels de ce l le-c i , meme si cet e f fe t est estime etre de 
i 'ordre de seuiement trois mois. Les autres facteurs modif ient encore moins 
i'age moyen de ia re t ra i te . 
Etant donne que les formuies de reduction des Indemnites de la securite 
sociaie ne produisent que de faibles post-positions du retrait de ia vie act ive, 11 
faudralt que les reformes introduites provoquent une baisse egaie a 9 % des 
revenus des retra i tes. Ces reformes permettraient au systeme de securite 
sociaie d'economiser .15.000 dollars sur les Indemnites. versees au cours de la 
vie du travai i ieur moyen. Dans ieur majeure partie done, les gains pour le 
systeme represented des pertes pour les t ravai i ieurs. Les personnes plus agees 
ne se donneront apparemment pas beaucoup de peine pour obtenir des revenus 
plus eieves lors de Ieur re t ra i te . 
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